The Ascent of Man: Legal Systems and the Discovery of an Environmental Ethic by Robinson, Nicholas A.
Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 15
Issue 2 Summer 1998 Article 6
June 1998
The Ascent of Man: Legal Systems and the
Discovery of an Environmental Ethic
Nicholas A. Robinson
Pace University School of Law, nrobinson@law.pace.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nicholas A. Robinson, The Ascent of Man: Legal Systems and the Discovery of an Environmental Ethic ,
15 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 497 (1998)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/6
The 'Ascent of Man': Legal Systems and
the Discovery of an
Environmental Ethic
PROF. NICHOLAS A. ROBINSON
CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LEGAL STUDIES
PACE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
"Nature, in the common sense, refers to essences un-
changed by man: space, the air, the river, the leaf. Art is
applied to the mixture of his will with the same things, as
in a house, a canal, a statute, a picture. But his operations
taken together are insignificant, a little chipping, baking,
patching, and washing, that in an impression so grand as
that of the world on the human mind, they do not vary the
result."'
A decade ago, firefighters in a warehouse on the Rhine in
Switzerland washed chemicals, solvents, and mercury into
the river, destroying all life in the river for miles, killing mil-
lions of fish, and endangering the water supplies of cities in
Germany and the Netherlands. This tragedy galvanized the
river valley states into action. They vowed to clean up the
river, not just from that incident but from the effects of hav-
ing used the river as a sewer for two centuries. But how
clean is clean? The goal for this calculated plan, which will
take decades to achieve, is symbolized by the salmon. When
salmon spawn again in the Rhine, then it will have been re-
stored. Will these nations succeed? If the twenty five year
history of our Clean Water Act offers a precedent, "restoring
and maintaining" the waters of the United States for fish and
swimming,2 the prognosis may be good.
1. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, NATURE (Houghton, Mifflin and Co. 1902).
2. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1994).
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Meanwhile, however, the wild salmon of the Pacific
Northwest become endangered in river after river because of
over-fishing, dams, and run-off from logging and develop-
ment. The Pacific salmon runs are going the way of the At-
lantic runs which are but a trickle in the northeast of our
continent. Meanwhile also, we are slaughtering the sturgeon
in the wild in Eurasia, mostly for the caviar trade in New
York and Europe, and having wiped out most sturgeon in the
United States of America (U.S.) and Canada a century ago,
we are, in this decade, wiping out sturgeon in the rest of its
wild range. The sturgeon are an ancient fish, surviving from
eras before humans left measurable imprints on the Earth.
Why do these icons of the seas affect us so? Or fail to
affect us? Why is the icon of restoring the wolf as a predator
in Montana or the Adirondacks such a powerful icon? And
why can we never hope to restore the grizzly bear to its tradi-
tional habitat in much of North America's west, like Califor-
nia where it graces the state's official flag? Will we succeed in
restoring the California condor, the largest bird in North
America, to its vast range? We took the last wild condors into
captivity in order to save the species from extinction due to
eating poisoned coyote carcasses or attracting the bullets of
riflemen; what makes us think we can let them live in the
skies again?
Humans evolved as one species among all the flora and
fauna of Earth, and it is perhaps because of (rather than in
spite of) our familiarity with animals that we have yet to ar-
rive at a consensus about our appropriate relationship with
the fauna and flora with which we have co-evolved. Of
course, a minority opinion still discounts the fact of evolution,
choosing not to accept the findings of Charles Darwin any
more today than in 1871 when he wrote The Descent of Man.3
Darwin observed that:
"The main conclusion arrived at in this work, namely, that
man is descended from some lowly organized form, will I
regret to think, be highly distasteful to many.... Man may
3. CHARLES ROBERT DARwIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN AND SELECTIONS IN RE-
LATION TO SEX (Princeton Univ. Press 1981) (1871).
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/6
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be excused for feeling some pride at having risen, though
not through his own exertions, to the very summit of the
organic scale; and the fact of his having thus risen, instead
of having been aboriginally placed there, may give him
hope for a still higher destiny in the distant future."
Putting aside debate about whether humans indeed are
at the "very summit of the organic scale," few would deny
that we are a dominant and dominating species. Anthropo-
genic change makes an impact on the Earth like that of no
other species. This Annual Conference on Animals and the
Law offers an opportunity for us to reflect on the content of
this high destiny in the distant future. We can step back
from the controversies surrounding road kills of deer in the
suburbs, or coping with a coyote roaming inside New York
City's limits, or making Jamaica Bay safe for birds and jet
plane, or restoring the fishable waters to New York Harbor.
We can take the long view as Darwin did. Let us take a mo-
ment to look at the origins of our thinking about animals in
the law, and ponder whither we are tending? Is there an "as-
cent of man" toward a still higher ethical destiny? How
should our ascent bring us to better understand our relation-
ships to animals, and all of nature?
Environmental law, subsuming as it does the traditional
sectors of wildlife conservation law and the newer subjects of
endangered species law, is the principal field in which our as-
sumptions about animals are being changed. The philoso-
phers who parse concepts about the rights of animals have
yet to leave the sort of impact in the halls of Congress or our
State Houses or our diplomatic conferences that the environ-
mental conservationists have imprinted. The evolution of our
legal concepts about animals, therefore, needs to be examined
through the thinking of those whose insights brought us the
still young field of environmental law.
Since Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote his seminal essay Na-
ture in 1836, society has evolved enormously in appreciating
the spiritual values that it finds in the natural environment,
and in giving expression to those values through adoption of
formal public policy and law. Emerson's slim little volume,
3
500 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
Nature, is the fountainhead of the conservation and environ-
mental movements in the United States of America. Little
read today, Nature has had an influence far beyond the pig-
eon hole to which formal philosophers today relegate it, as
being primarily an exposition on transcendentalism. Emer-
son's Nature was the inspirational textual authority for
Thoreau and Muir and Boroughs. In this work, Emerson
made discoveries, consciously for the first time in American
literature, that Aldo Leopold was to make anew a century
later in A Sand County Almanac4 and Rachael Carson a cen-
tury and a quarter later in Silent Spring.5 It is worth recal-
ling these roots of modern - or should we say post-modern -
environmental law progressing from nature appreciation
through natural history to ecology, for they bespeak an evolu-
tion in our understanding of natural systems and in the
power of the human assault on nature. Our generation needs
to discover them anew.
James Boswell's Life of Samuel Johnson quotes Dr.
Johnson as observing that "hunting was the labour of the
savages of North America, but the amusement of the gentle-
men of England."6 It was so seen in England because the
early inhabitants of the country, since at least the Roman oc-
cupation, denuded the land so extensively that the Norman
Conquerors shortly after 1066 had replanted "forests" as the
hunting preserves of the aristocracy, the gentlemen, and cre-
ated fish and game regimes as the prerogative of the upper
classes. By the time Elizabeth I reigned as monarch, as
Manwood's treatise of the Forest Laws amply demonstrates,
there was an elaborate system of administrative law to regu-
late the taking of all manner of animals and a sizable number
of plants in England.7 The law served to allocate rights to
nature according to the privileges of class.
We abandoned this aristocratic relationship to animals
during the colonization of the "new world." Here, the supply
of natural resources seemed inexhaustible, but increasingly
4. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (Oxford 1987) (1949).
5. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1962).
6. JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON (Richardson 1873).
7. MANWOOD's FOREST LAWS (Printed for the Societie of Stationers 1615).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/6
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there were those who saw through the illusion that nature
would yield its bounty forever. Emerson and Thoreau
bemoaned the coming of the mills and railroads of the early
industrial revolution, for they saw it cut people off from their
access to nature, and left the wastes of industry to accumu-
late. Muir, and the Sierra Club he founded, campaigned for
the creation of the national forests and national parks. Popu-
lar campaigns caused the Yellowstone and the Adirondack
preserves to be set aside. Teddy Roosevelt fought for the
elimination of the indiscrimate commercial hunting of wild
animals, favoring the ethics of the "sportsman," so that today
we still ban the sale of game in most of the U.S. The nation's
first "Biological Survey" became the Fish & Wildlife Service,
and nature sanctuaries were established. The Audubon Soci-
eties fought to ban the commercial taking of wild birds for
their plumage.
When he convened the 1908 White House Governors'
Conference on Conservation, President Theodore Roosevelt
succeeded in making conservation a major national policy is-
sue.8 Conservation took hold in Europe too, where in 1948
the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and
Natural Resources (IUCN) was established. But it would not
be until the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment that the United Nations would put these sorts of is-
sues before the international community, and then not for
twenty years later in the 1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, the "Rio Earth Summit,"
that all the heads of State of all the nations would convene to
place these issues on the global agenda of governments.
While "animals" as such are not debated, the Earth Summit
saw the adoption of the United Nations Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity,9 in which the states "conscious of the intrin-
sic value of biological diversity and the ecological, genetic,
social, economic, scientific, educational, cultural, recreational
and aesthetic values of biological diversity and its compo-
8. Proceedings of a Conference of Governors (May 13-15, 1908).
9. United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 20 (1993), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818,824.
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nents, and conscious also of the importance of biological di-
versity for evolution and for maintaining life sustaining
systems in the biosphere" adopted a new legal paradigm for
rethinking our uses of nature, and hems our relationship to
nature. In the same year, the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Europe adopted a Code of Practice for the Conser-
vation of Threatened Animals and Plants.
This reconfiguring of how we envision our relationship to
nature started in the second half of the 19th century and
evolved further as the study of natural history became more
systematic and the discipline of ecology was developed. Lead-
ing wildlife biologists, such as Aldo Leopold, made the intel-
lectual journey from Game Management10 to the formulation
of his "Land Ethic" in A Sand County Almanac. Leopold ob-
served that "despite nearly a century of propaganda, conser-
vation still precedes at a snail's pace.. .The usual answer to
this dilemma is 'more conservation education.' No one will
debate this, but is it certain that only the volume of education
needs stepping up? Is something lacking in the content as
well?" Leopold, the scientist, discovered anew that the moral
content was lacking, just as Emerson had posited the need for
the moral content a century before.
What Leopold called for was an "ethic dealing with man's
relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow
upon it." He worried that, "land, like Odysseus' slave-girls, is
still property. The land-relation is still strictly economic, en-
tailing privileges but not obligations." Leopold would have us
extend our human ethics that permit civilized behavior
among people, to embrace the living systems of the land as a
part of our community of interdependent parts. His exten-
sion "of our moral system of ethical relations simply enlarges
the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters,
plants, and animals, or collectively: the land." Albert
Schweitzer had found the same truth in the tropical nature of
Africa: "Ethics is nothing else than reverence for life.""
10. ALDo LEOPOLD, GAME MANAGEMENT (Univ. Of Wisconsin Press 1986)
(1933).
11. ALBERT SCHWEITZER, CIVILIZATION AND ETHics (A. & C. Black, ltd.
1923).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/6
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When we neglect this ethic and choose to destroy agricultural
"pests" with pesticides that also widely kill or harm other life
forms and impair the relationships which exist among these,
we may well end up destroying our song birds, and more, and
bringing cancers to ourselves as Rachel Carson described in
Silent Spring. Justice Blackmun's dissent, with Justices
Brennan and Douglas, in Sierra Club v.Morton,12 came close
to understanding this when he cited John Donne's Devotions
XVII: "No man is an iland, intire of itselfe; every man is a
peece of the Continent, a part of the maine.. .any man's death
diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankinde; And
therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls
for thee."13
Should not lawyers today reflect upon this evolution of
thought in society, if only because our law books still carry
the statutes and rules enacted to reflect, as if frozen in time,
the values of past eras as the policies of the present? Where
science is dynamic and displaces old hypothesis for new and
more refined understandings, and where philosophy admits
of self-criticism and seeks refinement, our legislation tends
merely to accumulate. It becomes encrusted with a dusty
sense of legitimacy made more authoritative with age. Envi-
ronmental law, rapidly assembled by society only in the last
quarter century in response to the teachings of Rachel Carson
and others, has still not shifted the accumulated weight of
the past's statutes and decisions about nature. Aldo Leo-
pold's ethic is hardly a household concept.
What, then, is the content of the environmental laws that
today comprise our Environmental Conservation Law of the
State of New York or volumes 16 and 40 of the United States
Code? Let us just limit our examination to animals and the
law. Why do we have six well taught courses involving ani-
mals in our law school today: (1) all of our property law
teaches us that animals are chattel, and that the capture of a
fox, in Pierson v. Post, 14 on the beaches of a long-ago Brook-
12. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361 (1972).
13. Id. at 760, 1378.
14. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
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lyn is fair game; (2) the nearly universally taught environ-
mental law pollution control courses, such as the Clean
Water Act's administrative systems to restore and maintain
swimmable and fishable waters or the Clean Air Act's na-
tional secondary air quality standards to preserve our wel-
fare and in which animal tests determine human exposure
limits to given chemicals, somehow also includes the Endan-
gered Species Act, 15 although the jurisprudential link to pol-
lution is a tenuous one; (3) conservation law courses, rarely
taught, involve maintaining the sustained yield of renewable
natural resources, including wildlife, and the managed use of
non-renewable resources; (4) the also rarely taught animal
welfare or rights course, involving the humane laws for do-
mestic animals and the articulation of legal and moral rights
for animals and plants; and (5) more widely taught are food
and drug laws, in which animals are tested to ensure that
cosmetics or foods and drugs will not be harmful to humans
when used, since we do not ethically experiment on fellow
humans; and (6) natural resources law, which while concen-
trating on oil and gas and hard rock mineral extraction, also
treats timber and hydro-electric water rights, with flora and
fauna as an interest that is either expendable during extrac-
tion, or the subject of some mitigation practices.
These six courses - all equally valid bodies of law from a
positivist's normative point of view - are premised on mutu-
ally inconsistent policy foundations. Humane animal welfare
laws would prevent unnecessary suffering by "sentient" ani-
mals during the toxicity testing of animals which are used to
estimate safe ambient environmental exposure limits for
human health purposes or safe internal consumption or skin
contact uses for food and drug products. In conservation law,
we ban cruel killing and require that game have a sportsman-
like chance against the hunter, yet in an animal rights course
we would ban all hunting as cruel. In our natural resources
law sector, animals are of such little economic importance
15. Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531 to 1544
(1994).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/6
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that the law of "incidental take" is hardly worth teaching
about.
It must strike us as extraordinary that we can teach, side
by side, inconsistent jurisprudential theories of the status of
flora and fauna in the law, and few among us take notice.
This phenomenon betrays the shallowness of our social con-
sensus and the poverty of our legal and intellectual thinking.
We lawyers both accept and reflect this fractured social view
that our society has toward animals.
Before we can make jurisprudential sense of this legal
relationship of human society to the flora and fauna compris-
ing various ecosystems, we need (a) to go beyond embracing
the rules of the past simply because we inherited them, and
(b) to attempt not just to define the ethics necessary to guide
human conduct amidst the community of all life, but to de-
sign legal systems of conduct to stimulate us toward discover-
ing that ethical relationship.
Emerson gave us a template for this. Emerson's Nature
recited the uses of nature in ways not unlike that of the pre-
amble of the Biodiversity Convention. That so many of his
perceptions have become accepted by the nations of the Earth
in a treaty is, in the Darwinian sense, real progress, but in
Leopold's view, it is hardly yet enough. Emerson, in 1836,
divided our uses of nature into four categories: (1) commod-
ity, (2)beauty, (3) language, and (4) discipline.
In commodity, we find most of our property laws about
flora and fauna. We consume plants and animals as renewa-
ble resources, whether in our shoe leather or luncheons, our
fur coats or the pages of our books and newspapers. Flora
and fauna serve us as a recreational objective, in hunting and
fishing and bird-watching, and we regulate these activities to
sustain them. Flora and fauna serve us as domestic animals,
in producing our milk or wool, and in serving as test animals
for our life-saving drugs and vain cosmetics. Few of us would
deny our dependence upon Emerson's category of commodity,
and it is precisely because we have so many different sectors
using animals, from farms to farm factories, from plantations
to pet stores, from pharmaceutical enterprises to the garment
industry, that we have enacted the hodge podge of different
9
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laws that we law professors dutifully teach each generation of
lawyers.
In beauty, we prize the commodity that is attractive, pay-
ing more for the handsome horse to ride, or pet or cat or bird.
We preserve extraordinary natural beauty in national parks
and monuments, state parks and local parks. We admire the
beauty of a wild bird or butterfly. We place the Hudson River
school of paintings in our museums and listen to the tone
poem in music, as in Debussy's Afternoon of a Faun.16 The
laws on parks and even wilderness lands, and the emerging
land use laws on countryside protection and green way man-
agement, grow out of the society's consensus about protecting
beauty.
In language, the metaphors of nature still creep into our
English or Spanish or other tongues. We speak of a sunny
personality, or a dark suspicion, a rosy disposition or badger-
ing boss. Nature has shaped our culture, our poetry and
literature, our song and myth, our movies and plays. The
deep seated integration of language and natural imagery may
have little to do with the law, but it certainly spices up our
advocacy about animals.
But it is in discipline that the rule of law has found its
greatest evolution, for here science and the love of nature
come together. Emerson saw discipline as the laws of nature.
You plant when the frost is gone, and can do little to force the
seasons. You breed when the time is right in natural cycles.
As you learn the laws of nature, you can harness them to
your advantage, as in the use of steam power or gravity flows,
but you must follow those rules carefully. We today know
that to build on a flood plain or a barrier island is to court
destruction of our structures during the now predictable flood
or hurricane. We know that collectively through the hydro-
logic absorption of the slender grasses a wetland stands up
more strongly against the storm surge than does the cement
dike or the rip rap of a rock barrier along the coast. Emerson
could only glimpse into what became the teachings of today's
ecologists, but he knew that the laws of nature provided a
16. CLAUDE DEBUSSY, AFTERNOON OF A FAUN (Phillips 1993).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/6
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framework in which human life, and all life, existed. Emer-
son, also of course, went beyond these utilitarian concepts of
nature. That others have not done so suggests that we need
new systems to facilitate that further evolution.
Most of our environmental laws today seek to harmonize
human conduct with what we have found science telling us
about how best to sustain human health and ecological sys-
tems. We identify and contain externalities that our eco-
nomic markets disregard. We seek to safeguard species of life
threatened or endangered with extinction through the En-
dangered Species Act or the Convention on the International
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).' 7 We have repealed
the laws for the draining and "reclamation" of wetlands, and
seek to preserve our remaining salt and freshwater wetlands.
We establish federal and state wildlife sanctuaries, so that
species may breed without human interference. We identify
migratory species and seek agreements among public and
private land holders and governments throughout the range
of the species to protect their habitats. We detect acid snow
and rain, perceive how they interrupt the food chain and re-
productive systems of biota, and, in turn, seek to use the
Clean Air Act to eliminate the precursors of water vapor pol-
lution. We identify chemicals that biologically accumulate in
the food chain of the Great Lakes and seek to eliminate them
at their source anywhere in the vast watershed of that hydro-
logic system, lest the whales and marine life at the mouth of
the St. Lawrence River continue to be poisoned.
Yet, as Aldo Leopold fretted, we still do not make the pro-
gress we must. Indeed, as the Earth Summit documented in
1992, the accumulated impacts of our human population
growth constantly raise the height of the hurdle we seek to
pass. The land ethic will not become a social consensus
through education alone. The content of our law must fash-
ion systems to induce such a change.
Ethical precepts become effective through social systems.
Ethical imperatives can produce social change, and let us
17. Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (CITES), Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249.
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cope with the environmental challenges we shall face. The
U.S. used "technology forcing" to induce the technological
revolution to clean up our surface waters. This October
1997, is the twenty fifth anniversary of the Clean Water
Act,18 and the surface waters are clear of the gross pollution
that accumulated after the second World War. Do the chal-
lenges of the next century lend themselves to such firm
solutions?
Today, all flora and fauna alike, along with humans, suf-
fer the consequences of the loss or erosion of the stratospheric
ozone layer. All biota alike are part of the web of life, and
with the rapid rate of species extinctions, the mutual rela-
tionships that have been characterized as a biological diver-
sity are weakened. Air pollution harms all living things, as
does water pollution. Climate change will have global as well
as local consequences, with the loss of coastal ecosystems to
the rising sea levels and coastal storms, and with the disrup-
tion of migration patterns and food supplies. Human induced
erosion and desertification still afflict vast areas. Tropical
and temperate forests alike, and wetlands around the world,
are being eliminated rapidly. Our human agriculture may
well face new threats by changed climatic conditions, the in-
troduction of exotic pests, and the familiar pests more resis-
tant to over-use of chemical commercial poisons.
The human ecology of our cities will be sorely tested. The
United Nations demographic projections are sobering. As we
add one billion more people in this coming decade, Earth will
have some 6.2 billion humans. At the 1972 Stockholm Con-
ference and when the Endangered Species Act was adopted,
we humans were only four billion. When Albert Schweitzer
discovered his ethic of Reverence for Life, 19 we were a mere
two million. When Emerson wrote Nature, Earth held only
one billion of us. The United Nations Children's Fund
18. The Clean Water Act was amended in 1972 strengthening the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act of 1965 by making all discharges illegal through
section 301, and the name was ultimately changed to the CWA in the 1977
amendments.
19. ALBERT SCHEITZER, REVERENCE FOR LIFE (Reginald H. Fuller trans.,
Harper & Row 1969) (originally published in German in 1966).
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/6
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(UNICEF) reports that 40,000 children die each day of water
borne diseases. In the space of this key note, statistically
1700 lives will be lost that routine sanitation could have
saved. Our growing numbers crowd our cities, for shelter,
jobs, education, companionship. Mexico City at the time of
the 1972 Stockholm Conference held some nine million peo-
ple, about the same as New York City today. Mexico City
now has over twenty million, and by 2000 may have twenty
five million, or more than all of the population of Canada.
So what can we do? Confronted with these develop-
ments, how can we afford to worry about discovering an envi-
ronmental ethic? Indeed! How can we afford not to make
that discovery? If we are the prisoners of our accumulation of
past practices and laws, we also have the key to our jail. We
have pioneered reforms in the law that permit us to create
new social patterns, new systems. Ecology is the study of sys-
tems, and where our laws shape complete systems, we trigger
decision-making that takes nature into account.
In 1969, Congress fashioned a new system to let us antic-
ipate and avoid adverse environmental impacts. The Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),20 and in the states
laws like SEQRA21 or CEQA, 22 have been extraordinary suc-
cesses in guiding us toward understanding the interrelation-
ships of our acts with those of other living systems. We stop
to look hard before we leap, and see the immediate and ripple
effects of our acts. I have seen real estate developers identify
and leave wildlife corridors in new housing projects, accept
the role of buffer zones near wetlands and water courses, and
preserve habitat. The Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) has been copied all over the world, and is law in every
Canadian province. What is sad is that less than half the
States in the U.S. have adopted legislation for EIA, and the
20. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 4321 to 4370d.
21. State Environmental Quality Reveiw Act (SEQRA), N.Y. Conserv. Law
§§ 8-0101 to 8-0117(McKinney 1997).
22. California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Cal. Pub. Res. Code
§§ 21,000 to 21,178.1 (1997).
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105th Congress has bills to weaken NEPA. 23 Moreover, as
you know, the U.S. Supreme Court over the past thirty years
has declined to accept the substantive duty that NEPA was
thought to have had, that upon identifying the alternatives to
a proposed action, the alternative version of the project that
least harms the environment should be selected. This sub-
stantive test is the law in California and New York under our
"little NEPAs", but since Vermont Yankee 24 has not been the
law under NEPA. Even when a system to promote an envi-
ronmental ethic is enacted, old attitudes are threatened and
oppose its implementation or continuation.
Another illustration is the shift to state and federal wet-
lands protection. As a third year student, I wrote the New
York State Tidal Wetlands Act, 25 and then lobbied it through
the legislature working with the Environmental Planning
Lobby twice, as Governor Rockefeller vetoed it once. Others
like me have done the same in two-thirds of our states, and
Congress extended the federal protection through Section 404
of the Clean Water Act. 26 Wetlands law, and the lore learned
from wetland protection battles, has done more to shift our
human society's relationship with the community of flora and
fauna that protect wetlands than is the case with most envi-
ronmental laws. A good illustration of this is a decision of the
Supreme Court of Minnesota, in County of Freeborn v.
Bryson,27 preventing a County from building a highway
across a marsh, under the Minnesota Environmental Rights
Act:
To some of our citizens, a swamp or marshland is physi-
cally unattractive, an inconvenience to cross by foot and an
obstacle to road construction or improvement. However, to
an increasing number of our citizens who have become con-
cerned enough about the vanishing wetlands to seek legis-
23. HR. 2400, 1 0 5 th Cong. § 502 (1997).
24. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NDRC, 435 U.S. 519, 98 S.Ct.
1197, 55 L.Ed.2d. 460 (1978).
25. NY. State Tidal Wetlands Act, N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law art. 25 (Mc-
Kinney's 1984 & 1996 Supp.).
26. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344.
27. County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 243 N.W.2d 316 (1976).
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/6
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lative relief, a swamp or marsh is a thing of beauty. To one
who is willing to risk wet feet to walk through it, a marsh
frequently contains a spring soft moss, vegetation of many
varieties, and wildlife not normally seen on higher ground.
It is quiet and peaceful - the most ancient of cathedrals -
antedating the oldest manmade structures. More than
that, it acts as nature's sponge, holding heavy moisture to
prevent flooding during heavy rainfalls and slowly releas-
ing the moisture and maintaining the water tables during
dry cycles. In short, marshes and swamps are something to
protect and preserve.
A generation ago, the conservationist Aldo Leopold es-
poused a 'land ethic' which he described as follows: 'All
ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that the
individual is a member of a community of interdependent
parts. His instincts prompt him to compete for his place in
the community, but his ethics prompt him also to co-oper-
ate (perhaps in order that there may be a place to compete
for). The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the
community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or
collectively: the land. In short, a land ethic changes the
role of homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-commu-
nity to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect
for his fellow-members, and also respect for the community
as such.'28
On this authority, the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1987
rejected an application to drain a wetland on a farm that had
been in the family since 1877, when some of the wetlands
were ditched and drained. Upholding the constitutionality of
Minnesota's wetlands law, and citing County of Freeborn and
Leopold, the court held:
We reaffirm our statement there that the state's environ-
mental legislation had given this land ethic the force of
law, and imposed on the courts a duty to support the legis-
lative goal of protecting our state's environmental re-
sources. Vanishing wetlands require, even more today
than in 1976 when Bryson was decided, the protection and
28. Id. at 322.
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preservation that environmental legislation was intended
to provide. 29
These illustrations suffice to confirm Darwin's prognosis.
There is a further ascent to which human society can aspire
and evidence that we are climbing that path. This record
suggests that individual attempts to save and rehabilitate
and release to the wild individual animals, however laudable
as a humanitarian act, are doomed unless we save the "wild."
If the habitats that flora and fauna require are also not pre-
served, or at least maintained in a fashion so that we humans
can co-exist with other species (something we can no longer
do for the grizzly bear in California and may fail to accom-
plish with the reintroduction of the California condor), then
we shall lose not only the individuals of those species, but the
species itself. We cannot long allow the automobile to replace
the hunter as the "predator" of deer in the suburbs, without
society finding the deer to be a pest and applying a poison;
sportsmanship is already gone from this relationship and is
replaced by road rage. What does it avail us to try to restore
the salmon long extinct from the Rhine while we extinguish it
from Washington and British Columbia?
We cannot wait for more education, or in a pollyanish
way hope that more of us (in and out of the 105th Congress)
will be interested in discovering the community of life and
finding an environmental ethic. The Bar has a responsibility
here. Lawyers are the architects of the orderly processes of
society. Despite the growth of environmental laws, society
has still an unsatisfactory, unsustainable, and intellectually
barren jurisprudence on "Animals and the Law." We cannot
afford to wait for a more refined consensus to emerge about
our human relationship to nature. We need to advocate the
strengthening of NEPA, the enactment of "Little NEPAs" in
Connecticut and New Jersey. Ultimately, we need to do what
scores of other nations have done in revising their constitu-
tions, we must amend the U.S. Constitution to provide the
rule that Minnesota has accepted. We must rethink our accu-
29. In the Matter of the Application of Allard Christenson, 417 N.W.2d.
607, 615 (1987).
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mulated laws and redesign new legal systems akin to what
we know of ecological communities.
So long as we primarily defend biodiversity strictly on
utilitarian grounds, society will not make the discovery that
we on Earth are one interdependent community of life. So
long as we apply the teachings of the science of ecology to our
human projects, to work primarily within the "discipline" of
nature, we shall not learn that we too need to fashion our own
systems to reflect our interdependence with animals and
other flora and fauna. So long as lawyers are content to leave
in full force the legal clutter of past ethical perceptions, we
shall retard others in making the sort of discovery about the
community of life that is today the precedent before the
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Do we not need to open ourselves to the implications of
Emerson? When we comprehend nature, is not the impres-
sion "so grand" upon our minds that it must be that each one
of us, individually, has the capacity to discover the ethics of
the community of life? If the deliberations of this Third An-
nual Conference lead us to fashion the legal systems to help
us all make this discovery, to make this climb up Darwin's
ascent, then our time will have been well spent.
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